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ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AND THEIR IMPORTANCE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
This Explanatory Statement has been drawn up following exchanges of view in 
the Sub-Committee on Security and Disarmament on 26 April and 31 October 1985. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
(i) General approach to the problem of arms control and disarmament 
The decision to draw up this report reflects the importance for the European 
Community of arms control and disarmament. But these matters are also 
important for the entire human community, East and West, North and South, and 
not just for this generation but also for the generations which, we can only 
hope, are to come. 
3 Although there are widely diverging views within the European Parliament on 
\·arious aspects of arms control and disarmament, on other aspects of these 
questions there is considerable agreement. 
4 Thus, for example, although there may be disagreement about the methods of 
achie\·ing disarmament and about the precise nature of Europe's relations with 
the t~o superpowers, there is a broad measure of agreement on the urgent 
necessity of achieving effective multilateral arms control and disarmament and 
on the need for the voice of the European Community to be heard and for its 
views to be taken into account. 
5 It is the Rapporteur's intention first to examine recent developments and 
tl1e current situation in this field as objectively as possible and secondly, in 
making concrete suggestions. to concentrate on the points on which a clear 
majority of members of the European Parliament can agree. 
6 The Rapporteur proposes neither on the one hand unilateral disarmament nor, 
on the other hand, complacency. Our aim is neither to win the arms race nor 
to create it. Our aim is first to limit it and then, if possible, to end it 
on a mutually-balanced and verifiable basis. The report attempts to make a 
pragmatic, reasonable and constructive contribution in the field of 
multilateral disarmament. 
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7 Total disarmament is, for the foreseeable future, an unrealistic goal. The 
experience of history lends its weight to the reality and the perceived values 
of mutual fear. However, just as we must not be naive if we are to preserve 
our freedom, so we must not be despairing if we are to guarantee the future of 
our planet. 
(ii) Timing of the report 
8 The report is being prepared at a propitious moment in East-West relations. 
Although major problems remain to be overcome and although the relative failure 
of arms control negotiations in the past does not permit a high degree of 
optimism, the resumption of the dialogue between the two superpowers since the 
CS Presidential election in ~ovember 1984 means that there can now be real hope 
for progress towards arms control and disarmament. The improvement in 
East-~est relations in recent months has already led to limited progress, for 
example at the !lutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks in Vienna, and at the 
Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building measures and 
Disarmament in Europe. 
0 The talks between President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev which took place in 
Geneva in Xovember 1985 are the most important recent development in the arms 
·control sphere and are central to the hopes for progress. 
10 Ho~ever, the other sets of negotiations which are taking place in other 
forums remain highly significant both for their own sake and because of their 
potential relationship to the bilateral Geneva talks on arms control. 
(iii) Scope of the report 
1 I This report, while not duplicating any of the other reports which are being 
prepared within the Sub-Committee, will attempt to cover briefly all the major 
arenas where arms control and disarmament negotiations are taking place: 
- Th~ Geneva talks between the two superpowPrs which opened on 12 March, 
- The ~utual and Balanced Force Reduction (~BFR) talks in Vienna, 
- The CX Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, 
- The CSCE Conference on Confidence- and Security-building measures and 
Disarmament in Europe (CCBDE or CDE) in Stockholm, 
- The role of the United Nations in the disarmament field. 
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12 The report will also deal with a number of other aspects of arms control 
and disarmament including the role of peace movements, nuclear-free zones and 
some economic aspects of armament and disarmament. 
(iv) The role of the European Community and the European Parliament 
13 Any decisions taken in the disarmament and arms control fields are of 
~normous importance to the citizens of the European Community. The European 
Parliament is, therefore, not merely a casual observer of the various 
11egotiations which are taking place, but, as the directly elected 
representative Assembly of the people of Europe, is responsible for protecting, 
insofar as possible, their real and immediate interests. 
1~ The Governments of all the Member States of the European Community do 
partic1pate in some of the forums already mentioned, such as at the United 
\ations General Assembly and at the Stockholm CSCE Conference. In the 
discussions which take place there they can and do make known their views 
indlvidually and, through the Presidency, collectively. Some of the Member 
States also take part in other forums such as the MBFR talks in Vienna and the 
Cc·tdr:-rt?nce on Disarmament in Geneva. 
1 < .• Sometimes, however, the negotiations are entirely bilateral between the 
superpowers, as is the case with the ongoing 'umbrella' talks which are taking 
plaee between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva. 
16 ~hile the Twelve have welcomed and supported, as has the Parliament, the 
talks which are now taking place between the United States and the Soviet 
r~i0n. they have at the same time emphasised that these negotiations are 
situated in the more general context of East-West relations as a whole. 
Europe is, and has always been closely concerned in such negotiations, and this 
b&~ recognised by President Reagan. whose first act, after concluding his 
Summit talks witlt ~r Gorbachev in Geneva, was to brief the NATO Heads of 
Government in Brussels. 
17 The potential influence of the European Community and the Parliament on the 
super-powers have been increased by the facts that further US-USSR summits are 
planned for 1986 and 1987, thus providing opportunities for bringing a 
Community view:point to bear - opportunities which it should seize. Further, 
the incorporation into the Community Treaties, by means of the European Act 
sign~d on 17 February 1986, of European Political Cooperation gives Parliament 
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new possibilities to influence the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve. Third, 
the Parliament must pursue with the Foreign Ministers the proposal made in the 
Klepsch Report of April 1984 •1 and the Hinsch Report of April 19842 for new 
procedures, based on the so-called 'Gymnich' formula, 3 to ensure closer and 
more constructive mutual consultation bPtween the Foreign Ministers and the 
l"S . l.. 
B. THE GENEVA ARMS TALKS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION 
(i) Background to the Geneva talks 
18 ~r Shultz, the CS Secretary uf State, and Mr Gromyko, then Soviet Foreign 
~lnister, met in Geneva on 7 and 8 January 1985 to work out a joint 
understanding of the subject and the aims of the talks. In the joint 
statement issued after that meeting the sides agreed 'that the subject of the 
negotiations would be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, 
b~th strategic and i~termediate-range, with all the questions considered and 
resol \"ed in their inter-relationship'. They further agreed that the 
objectives of the negotiations 'would be to work out effective agreements aimed 
at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, and limiting 
and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability'. 
19 It was agreed that the negotiations would be conducted by a delegation from 
each side divided jnto three groups (one to deal with strategic nuclear 
weapons, one with intermediate-range nuclear weapons and one with space 
(li) The INF and START talks 
...:l.l Irr effect the Geneva talks replace both the ll\F (Intermediate Nuclear 
Force' and the START (Strategic Arms Reduction) talks which were broken off by 
rte Soviet Cnion following the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Western 
R0~olution on shared European interests, risks and requirements in the 
Security field, OJ C 127/70, 14.5.1984: see also Explanatory Statement, 
paras. 65-66. (Doc. 1-80/848) 
2 R~&olution on political relations between the European Community and the 
l"nited States, OJ C 127/89, 14.5.1984, paras. 10 and 30. 
3 In Apnl 1974 the Foreign i'1inisters of the Nine agreed to delay a decision in 
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Europe in \ovember 1983. The Geneva talks also include under their 'umbrella' 
the question of weapons in space. Although the INF and START talks did not 
produce concrete results, it is worth considerfng them briefly in the context 
of this report since they have prepared the ground for certain aspects of the 
current Geneva talks and since some of the ideas put forward at the earlier 
negotiations can be expected to resurface in one form or another. 
21 The INF talks, which opened in November 1981, concerned intermediate-range 
nucl~ar forces in Europe. At the heart of the negotiations was the NATO 
decision of 1979 to deploy Pershing-!! and cruise missiles in Western Europe, 
in response to the Soviet Union's deployment of SS-20 missiles. Whereas the 
Soviet [nion wished in the negotiations to prevent the deployment of 
Per~hing-II and cruise missiles while maintaining its own already deployed 
SS-20 missiles, the United States would only consider non-deployment to the 
extellt that the Soviet Union would destroy its SS-20s. Before the breakdown 
of the negotiations, a number of serious proposals were made. 
briefly, were amongst the more important proposals put forward: 
The following, 
-The 'zero option' put forward by the United States called for the destruction 
of all SS-20s land also the earlier, less sophisticated SS-4s and 5s) in 
exchange for an agreement not to deploy Pershing-11 and cruise missiles in 
~estern Europe: 
- Soviet proposals to withdraw SS-20s into the Eastern part of the USSR; 
- The ~a-called 'walk-in-the-woods' proposal put forward by the two chief 
negotiators but rejected by their respective governments: namely that the 
Soviet (nion should be allowed to deploy 75 SS-20s in 'European Russia' and 
0 0 in the Eastern part of the USSR; neither side was to deploy in Europe 
more than 150 of certain specified types of aircraft capable of delivering 
nuclear weapons: NATO was to be permitted to deploy 75 cruise 
mi~sile-launchers with 4 missiles each, but no Pershing II missiles: and 
fresh negotiations were to open on further reductions immediately this 
~greement was signed: 
- the so-called 'walk-in-the-park' proposal, disclaimed by both sides, 
~nvisaging equal reductions of 572 warheads on each side. 
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~-· The START talks, aimed at reducing the level of strategic nuclear forces, 
or~ned jn Geneva in June 1982. The talks were a continuation of the earlier 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The lack of progress at the SfA~T 
talk~ before they were suspended in December 1983 reflected both the difficult 
international climate and a major difference of opinion between the Soviet 
Cnion, ~hich wished to freeze existing levels of nuclear weapons, and the 
Cn1ted States which wished to achieve reductions in existing levels of 
ballistic missile warheads. 
(iii) The Reagan-Gorbachev Summit 
23 The lack of progress during 1985 in the Geneva arms talks indicated the 
r1eeJ for a new impulse to be given to the negotiations on arms control and 
disarmament. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met in Geneva 
in \ovember 1985 for two days of talks, much of the time being spent without 
advisers. In the resulting joint statement (see Annex) the two leaders 
concluded that 'a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought'. They 
pledged that their countries would 'not seek to achieve military superiority'. 
It ~as agreed that work at the Geneva arms talks should be accelerated, and 
early progress was called for particularly in regard to 'the principle of 50% 
reductions in the nuclear arms of the VS and the USSR appropriately applied, as 
~ell as the idea of an interim INF agreement'. The leaders further agreed 
that during these negotiations 'effective measures for verification of 
compliance with obligations assumed will be agreed upon'. 
~4 President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev also agreed to studies on 
centres to reduce nuclear risk (a new agreement on the Washington Moscow 
'hot-line' was achieved). They reaffirmed their commitment to the Nuclear 
~eapons \on-Proliferation Treaty, and in particular to Article 6 thereof which 
calls for negotiations on matters of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament. 
Tbe t\,'O leaders also called for progress in the MBFR talks at Vienna, in the 
Geneva negotiations on chemical weapons and at the Conference on Disarmament in 
Europe in Stockholm . 
.2~· 111 commenting on the talks. President Reagan said that 'the real report 
card on Geneva will not come in for months or even years'. He listed the 
problems that remained to be solved as: the need to reduce sharply nuclear 
offensive weapons and to move to non-nuclear defensive systems: peaceful 
resolution of conflicts in Asia, Africa and Central America: the advancement 
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of the cause of liberty: and the fulfilment of international treaties. Mr 
Gorbachev saw the needs to be: to decrease the threat of nuclear war: to 
prevent the arms race moving into space: and to reduce the arms race on earth. 
Thirteen out of the sixteen Heads of Government of NATO states and all 
tlteir Foreign Ministers, met in Brussels on 21 November to hear President 
Reaga11' s report on the summit. All expressed approval, the principal absentee 
being President ~litterrand, who stated in Paris that European countries should 
together protect themselves against an arms race in space. 
27 As regards the Press, Le ~onde took the view that Mr Gorbachev was banking 
on the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) becoming a victim of budget 
reductions by the CS Congress, and being less strongly pursued after the end of 
President Reagan's term of office in November 1988. 4 The Financial Times 
quoted the view of Soviet specialists that Congress may regard closer US-USSR 
relations, rather than progress in the Geneva arms talks. as a reason for 
cutting back on the US weapons programmes: the importance of the summit might 
thus lie in developments in other areas. 5 Most journals noted no concrete 
progress had been made on any aspects of arms control or disarmament, and some 
belie\'ed that lack of such progress before the next summit in June 1986 in 
~asl1ington, DC, and the one thereafter in the USSR in 1987 would be badly 
6 
received in the US, the USSR and in Europe. 
(iv) The US Strategic Defence Initiative 
28 One of the most contentious issues at the Geneva arms talks is the 
Srrar~gic Defence Initiative (SOl) announced by President Reagan on 23 March 
The question of the SDI is also being mentioned by Mr Bernard Reymond 
in his report 011 the European Community and the Security of Western Europe. 
Ho~ever. since SDI so clearly has implications for current arms control 
negotiations it has seemed appropriate to include some consideration of the SDI 
in this report. 
20 The purpose of the SDI, currently a research programme, is to identify ways 
to exploit recent advances in ballistic missile defence technologies that have 
potential for strenghtening deterrence. The SDI is not based on any 
4
.le ~onde, 23 Xo\'ember 1985 
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single or preconceived notion of what an effective defence system would look 
like. A number of different concepts, involving a wide range of technologies, 
are being examined. The aim of the SDI is to substitute for the threat of 
nuclear retaliation, insofar as possible. a plausible defence against nuclear 
attack, to replace 'mutual assured destruction' with 'mutual assured survival'. 
30 As a theoretical longterm aim, there is a case for its being considered 
laudable. The world might indeed be a safer place if technology could be 
d~veloped and made available to all concerned which would prevent a nuclear 
attack from reaching its target. The strongly and widely held doubts which 
ha\·e been expressed about the SDI, however, relate not only as to whether the 
aim is desirable but even more as to whether it is achievable. Four 
dtstinguished Americans wrote recently in Foreign Affairs 7 : 'What is centrally 
and fundamentally wrong with the President's objective is that it cannot be 
achie•:ed'. It is possible that the ultimate potential of the SDI is not total 
defence but rather the provision of enough protection for US land based 
missiles and bombers to prevent a first strike attack. 
31 A second major objection to the SDI is that it would also encourage the 
Soviet Cnion both to pursue similar technology and to enhance· its nuclear 
strike capability to render the SDI ineffective. Just as it is difficult to 
predict precisely what results the SDI research will provide, so it is 
difficult to predict precisely what the technological and strategic response to 
the SDI will be. 
32 A third objection is that the SDI, whatever its effectiveness in the long 
term, seems certain to lead to a degree of uncertainty and instability in the 
short and medium term. For, frightening though the threat of 'mutual assured 
d~struction' may be, it has proved an effective deterrent, acceptable to both 
sides. To move away from that concept without simultaneously ensuring 'mutual 
assured survival' would be to introduce a dangerous variable into the strategic 
equation. 
7 
'The President's Choice: Star ~ars or Arms Control' by McGeorge Bundy, 
George Kennan, Robert Mc~amara and Gerard Smith, in Foreign Affairs, Winter 
12§~L§2· 
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33 A related consideration is that the deployment of an SDI system or the 
field testing of such a system or its components, would breach Article 5 of the 
1~72 Anti-Ballistic ~issile Treaty - one of the few significant arms control 
achie\·ements. 
34 Against this background, it must be recalled that the Soviet Union, despite 
its protestations about the SDI, has been continuing a programme of research on 
both traditional and advanced anti-ballistic missile <BMD) technologies that 
hn'> been underway for many years. Furthermot·e, the Soviet Union, like the 
lnited States, has also been researching space weapons and is understood 
already to have a fully deployed anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. These 
anti-satellite weapons, as well as those being developed by the United States, 
Lht~at~n to endanger the important monitoring and communication functions which 
the satellites perform. In a sense, therefore, President Reagan's SDI 
initiati\·e is based on research (such as ASAT and BMD research) which has 
already been undertaken for some time by both sides. 
35 It has been argued that technological progress has a momentum of its own 
and is inevitable. If so, it is a sad reflection on humanity that science 
slt<:•uld control man rather than man science. Less philosophically, if the 
att~mpt to pursue the SDI is inevitable, so too is the attempt to develop 
technology to render the SDI ineffective. 
36 Individual ~estern European countries have so far been somewhat divided and 
uncertain in their response to the SDI initiative. The tentativeness of their 
response is an indication of the politically sensitive and strategically 
significant implications of the SDI. The arguments which have been outlined 
briefly in this paper are not meant to represent a case against the initiative 
but are advanced to suggest that the issue should be approached with a modicum 
of scepticism. 
37 ~rs Thatcher and President Reagan were reported to have reached a 
constructive agreement in December 1984 on four points in relation to the 
~rraregJc Defence Initiative: 
The ~est is seeking balance with the Soviet Union, not superiority over it, 
- SDI is a research programme and deployment must be a matter of negotiation, 
taking account of existing agreements, 
- The purpose of the exercise is to enhance, not to undermine deterrence, 
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The aim of arms control negotiations should be to seek lower levels of 
offensive forces. 
;s Scepticism must, however, remain even about the research programme itself-
its potential, its possible destabilising effect, its relationship to the arms 
race - and in ~arch 1985, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe 
posed a number of critical questions about the SDI. He said that the US 
nuclear guarantee must be enhanced by defensive deployments, 'not only enhanced 
at the end of the process but at its very inception'. He also feared that 
'the prospect of new defences being deployed would inescapably crank up the 
levels of offensive nuclear systems designed to overwhelm them'. 
39 The SDI initiative itself, whatever view one takes of it, clearly has 
implications for the future relations between Europe and the United States. 
Quite apart from its strategic significance it has a political significance, 
and it has become another source of difficulty in relations between the Member 
Stares and the CSA. not least because no European leaders were consulted before 
the SDI was launched. On the one hand the British Government has been the 
011ly one to sign a formal agreement with the US Government covering the terms 
on ~hich British companies and universities should participate in SDI research 
projects. On the other hand, the French Government at first rejected a formal 
agreement of this sort, but has recently been in contact with the US Department 
of Defence. ~o other Governmer1t in the Twelve has made a formal agreement 
~ith the lS Government, but they have not dissuaded individual research bodies 
from exploring the possibilities of obtaining research contracts for SDI. 
(v) The EUREKA Initiative 
~0 President ~itterrand's 'EUREKA' initiative for joint European high 
u·dlllOlogy resea,·ch is significant in the Ct)lltext of Europe's response to SDI . 
. \ number of its aspects relate closely to SDI research fields: 
- 0pt r·onics 
- ne~ 1ndustrial materials 
- fifth generation megacomputers 
- high-energy laser and particle beams 
-the growth in 'artificial intelligence'. 
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41 Since it was launched early in 1985, the EUREKA proposal has made 
considerable progress. Several Community Governments have pledged funds to 
support it, as has the European Commission: projects have been identified as 
potentially worthy of support in the EUREKA framework: and the participation 
of non-EEC countries has been provided for. The European Parliament, in a 
te5olution adopted in October 19858 welcomed the EUREKA initiative, 'both as a 
non-military European response to the SDI programme and as the means for an 
aggressive European technological and industrial policy'. Parliament also 
wished the ECREKA project to be incorporated into the EEC, that the Commission 
should have a vital role in the project's development, and that it should 
itself participate in its definition and implementation. The Rapporteur 
should, perhaps, add that SDI cannot be accurately classified as 'military' and 
E[REKA as 'non-military'. 
C. THE MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION (MBFR) TALKS 
42 The ~BFR talks, which have been in progress in Vienna since 1973, concern 
the 'mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in 
c~ntral Europe' ~nd are confined to conventional forces and weapons. Although 
the two sides have reached a degree of common ground, no agreement has yet been 
reached on troop reductions. Agreement has, however, been reached on the 
following fundamental objectives: 
(iJ reductions should lead to 'common collective ceilings' on forces in the 
area of 900,000 men, including not more than 700,000 ground fo1·ces, 
'iii r~ductions would be in two phases: in phase 1 only US and Soviet forces 
would be withdrawn, 
•iiil reductions could affect armaments ~swell as numbers of forces, 
'iVl 'associated measures' (including, most importantly, means of 
verification) would accompany an agreement on force reductions. 
43 Amongst the remaining points of disagreement, the following are amongst the 
mo~t significant: 
8 
Resolution on Europe's response to the modern technological challenge, 8 
October 1985, paras. 5, 7 - 9. 
Poniatowski, Doc. A2-109/85) 
OJ C 288/34, 11.11.1985. (Report by "1r 
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- ~estern demands for more specific arrangements for verification, 
- ~estern calls for prior agreement on 'data' (NATO claims that the Warsaw Pact 
underestimates its current troop strength), 
- Eastern demand for separate ceiling on the forces of each country, 
Eastern demand for separate ceiling on air force personnel, 
- Eastern demand for more specific agreements about the withdrawal of 
armame-nts. 
44 Proposals have been made by both sides with regard to such matters. In 
198~ both ~ATO and the Warsaw Pact presented separate draft treaties for the 
fir~t time. A new ~ATO proposal was introduced in April 1984. 
45 ~ost recently, on 15 February 1985, the Warsaw Pact presented a new 
proposal with a view to breaking the deadlock at the MBFR talks. The proposal 
f•rovided for the initial reducti?n of 20,000 troops by the Soviet Union and 
13,000 by the CS within a year of an agreement being reached. This would be 
follo~ed by a larger cut back in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces to a level of 
0 00,000 men on each side. The plan foresaw a second stage during which the 
states ill Central Europe would agree to freeze the level of their forces for 
three years. 
·16 These proposals were criticised by the West as being inadequate as regards 
v,c· r if icat ion. (Jn 3 December 1985 NATO put forwar·d new proposals based on 
those of the ~arsaw Pact. An initial reduction of 11,500 Soviet, and 5,000 US 
troops was envisaged, followed by the three-year freeze proposed earlier. The 
11e~ elements in the NATO plan were that the initial withdrawal could be made 
~ithout prior agreement on data, and that verification procedures would be 
considerably intensified. It is to be hoped that the Reagan-Gorbachev Summit 
O:•f \~wember 1985 1.-.'ill in fact open up avenut-s towards progress in the MBFR 
r.alks. 
D. THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT 
47 The Conference on Disarmament ICDl, formerly the Committee on Disarmament, 
constitutes the single multilateral negotiating body for global disarmament. 
Amongst the more important matters dealt with by the CD are the following: 
til The attempt to negotiate a comprehensive ban on the development, 
production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, 
Iii) Xon-Proliferation Treaty/Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban, 
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liii) Prevention of the arms race in outer space, 
«iv) Radiological weapons. 
(i) Chemical weapons 
48 In recent years the CD has perhaps registered its greatest degree of 
progress in the field of chemical weapons. The Rapporteur is conscious that a 
separate report is being drawn up on chemical and biological weapons within the 
Sub-Committee on Sec4rity and Disarmament. While it is not his intention to 
trespass on a field which is being dealt with elsewhere, the Rapporteur will 
deal briefly with this question in order to provide as complete a picture as 
possible of the various disarmament negotiations which are taking place. 
49 The particular significance of chemical weapons in the disarmament process 
is that there appears to be a realistic possibility of eliminating these 
~eapons entirely through a process of negotiation. This would both be a 
significant achievement in itself and a positive example of arms control 
negotiations which could have a positive impact in other forums. 
50 Briefly, there are two main reasons for optimism about the prospects for 
progress in this field at the CD in Geneva. 
firstly, there ap~ea1·s to be a relativ~ly high degree of international 
consensus that these weapons should be abolished. The Ad-Hoc Working 
Group of the Conference on Disarmament (the CD/CW) has accepted - as 
indeed the ~nited States and the Soviet Union have - that the objective in 
relatioh to chemical weapons is comprehensive disarmament and not a mere 
ceiling or set of limitations. On the Western side there has indeed 
already been a degree of unilateral arms control in this field with the ~K 
abandoning production in 1955 and subsequently disposing of its stockpile 
and the rnited States unilaterally renouncing further production in 1969. 
Secondly, it appears possible to extract chemical weapons from the 
strategic equation to an extent that is not possible with many other forms 
of weapons. The development, production and stock-piling of biological 
and toxin weapons has already been entirely prohibited by the 1972 
Convention (although it is alleged that the Soviet Union has breached the 
convent ion). The use of chemical weapons has also been prohibited by the 
- 26 - PE 97.992/fin./B 
Geneva Protocol of 1925, and although its provisions has not always been 
respected - most recently in the Iran/Iraq war - there appears to be a 
solid basis for progress. 
51 Although major problems remain to be overcome in the negotiations, notably 
Kith regard to verification procedures, considerable progress has been made~ 
Significantly, in February 1984, the Soviet delegation accepted in principle 
the international on-site inspection of the destruction of chemical weapons 
stockpiles. In March 1985 the British Government made proposals for the 
routine inspection of civil chemical plants and, in a further paper which drew 
on pre\'ious Canadian and Netherlands Government papers, in April 1985 set out 
proposals for the institutions necessary to implement a Chemical weapons 
convention. These included a new international organisation to implement the 
cortvent ion. which would have power to conduct random, routine. international, 
on-site inspection of declared chemical plants. 
(ii) The Non-Proliferation Treaty/Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Tlte \on-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970. 
52 The Treaty contains both the acceptance by the principal nuclear powers of 
undertakings to engage in negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament and a 
t:.:•J rP~pondillg commitment by the non-nuclear states which became parties to the 
Tr~at~ not to ent@r the nuclear arms race. 
and France - have not signed the Treaty. 
Two nuclear weapon states - China 
53 If the Treaty is to be judged on the basis of its implementation by the 
!tun-nuclear weapons states which are party to it then it may be considered a 
major success (although it is a matter of grave concern that some states 
remained outside the framework of the NPT). However, such a positive 
judgement cannot be made on the discharge by the nuclear weapon states parties 
of their obligation to proceed to the negotiated containment, curtailment and 
~limination of nuclear weapons. 
54 The \PT Third Review Conference took place in September 1985 and provided a 
quinquennial opportunity to review the functioning of the Treaty. The Final 
D~claration noted the great and serious concerns expressed about the nuclear 
capab1lity of South Africa and Israel and the calls on all States to prohibit 
the transfer of nuclear facilities, resources or devices to these countries. 
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The Conference affirmed its determination to strengthen further the barriers 
against the proliferation of nuclear weapons ... to additional States. It 
called for nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 
55 A comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, complementing the partial Test Ban Treaty 
of 1963 lin which the United States, the Soviet Union and the UK agreed to halt 
tests in the atmosphere. in space and underwater) would represent a pragmatic 
and significant step towards multilateral nuclear disarmament and would 
constitute a timely demonstration of a serious commitment to the process of 
arms control and disarmament. Two further partial test bans signed by the US 
and Soviet Union in 1974 and 1976 have not been ratified because of disputes 
about verification and linkage (the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful 
Xuclear Explosions Treaty). Although the CD set up an ad-hoc working group on 
this question in 1982, and although, in June 1983, Sweden submitted to the CD a 
revised version of its 1977 draft Treaty banning nuclear weapon test explosions 
in all environments, little progress has been made. 
56 On 17 April 1985 the Soviet Union said that it was ready to agree to a 
moratarium on the testing of nuclear weapons to coincide with the fortieth 
anrliversary of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. 
Tripartite negotiations from 1977 to 1980 between the US, the UK and the Soviet 
lnion on a comp1·ehensive test ban Treaty are reported to have been close to 
final agreement when they were suspended. The NPT Third Review Conference in 
September 1985 deeply regretted that a comprehensive multilateral nuclear test 
bar1 Treaty banning all nuclear tests by all states in all environments for all 
time had not been concluded so far, and called on all nuclear weapon states to 
negotiate such a treaty. 
(iii) Outer Space 
57 The CD also attempts to negotiate on preventing the militarisation of outer 
srare. Its work in this field is, however, overshadowed by the bilateral 
'umbrella' negotiatior1s which opened between the United States and the Soviet 
rnion in Geneva in ~arch 1985. One of the three groups at the bilateral talks 
is t0 deal with space weapons. 
58 A number of proposals concerning outer space have come before the CD in 
receut years, notably: 
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- a So\·iet proposal to negotiate a treaty prohibiting the stationing in outer 
space of weapons of 'any kind', 
- a proposal, submitted by the group of non-aligned countries, for an agreement 
to prevent the arms race in outer space 'in all its aspects'. 
59 As a result of disagreement over a mandate for a working group on this 
subject at the CD, no working group has been set up and little concrete 
progress has been made. 
(iv) Radiological Weapons 
60 Since 1979 the CD has been considering the question of an international 
convention prohibiting the development, production. stockpiling and use of 
rarliological weapons. A joint US/Soviet proposal on the major elements of a 
convention constitutes the basis for discussion. (The US and the Soviet Union 
define a radiological weapon as any device, other than a nuclear explosive, 
specific~lly designed tu employ radioactlve material by disseminating it to 
cause destruction, damage or injury by means of the radiation produced by the 
decay of such material, as well as any radioactive material other than that 
9 produced by a nuclear explosive device, specifically designed for such use) 
61 Among the problems which have arisen are those of agreeing a definition of 
radiological weapons (since many counries object to a definition specifically 
excluding nuclear explosives) and of defining the scope of the convention. 
E. THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT 
IN EUROPE 
'This Conference and the CSCE process more generally are dealt with in a 
se~~arate report being drawn up within the Sub-Committee on Security and 
Di~armamentl. 
62 The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and 
Disarmament in Europe opened in Stockholm in January ~984. The Conference is 
ar, integral part of the CSCE process (Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europel. The participating States agreed at the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in 
~adrid l 1980-1983) to convene the Stockholm Conference and the Concluding 
Docu1nent of the ~adrid meeting sets out the mandate of the Conference. 
9 . 
The SIPRI Yearbook 1983 
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63 The mandate states that the aim of the Stockholm Conference is 'as a 
substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the CSCE 
... to undertake in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to 
make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving 
disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to 
refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations'. 
64 It is envisaged that the Conference will take place in two principal 
stages. The first stage, which opened in January 1984, is devoted to 'the 
negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and 
security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military 
confrontation in Europe'. A future cSCE follow-up meeting (the next one is 
due to commence in Vienna in November 1986) will 'consider ways and appropriate 
means for the participating states to continue their efforts for security and 
disarmament in Europe, including the question of supplementing the present 
mandate for the next stage of the (Stockholm) Conference'. 
65 Despite the title of the Conference (indeed it is sometimes referred to as 
the Conference on Disarmament or CDE), it is clear that the mandate does not 
envisage discuss1on of disarmament as such during the first phase of the 
Conference. However, developments at the Stockholm Conference are worth 
examining briefly in this report because, notwithstanding the mandate, a number 
of disarmament-related proposals have already been put forward by the Soviet 
Lnion and because any progress at the Stockholm Conference and indeed in the 
CSCE process generally could have a positive impact on disarmament negotiations 
for other forums. 
66 During 1984, five sets of proposals were tabled at the Stockholm 
Conference, most notably by NATO, by the Soviet Union and by the Neutral and 
~on-aligned (the other proposals have come from Romania and Malta). 
67 On 3 December 1984 a working structure for the Conference was finally 
agt~ed on the basis of a proposal by the neutral and non-aligned countries. 
Th~ structure provides for two working groups - one to deal with Helsinki-type 
confidence- and security-building measures and the other will consider a 
limitation in the size of military manoeuvres and greater openness in the 
disposition of military forces as well as the Soviet Union's 'political' 
proposals, notably for a treaty on the non-use of force. 
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68 During the fifth session of the Conference which opened on 29 January 1985, 
the Soviet Cnion put forward a proposal entitled 'Basic provisions for a treaty 
on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful 
relations•. The proposal envisages that the participating states would commit 
tttemselves not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons. 
1his commitment according to the proposal, would be applicable not only in 
Europe but outside Europe including in space and in international waters. The 
Cnited States has indicated that it is ready to confirm the principle of the 
non-use of force in the context of a global agreement on concrete confidence-
and security-building measures but believes that the Soviet Union has not yet 
d~monstrated that it is willing to discuss proposals in this sense. 
u 0 On 8 ~ay 1985 President Reagan, in a major address to the European 
Parliament, made four proposals for the easing of tension between East and 
~est. one of which concerned the CDE. The President suggested that the CDE 
should 'act promptly and agree on the concrete confidence-building measures 
proposed by the ~ATO countries. The USA is prepared to discuss the Soviet 
proposal on non-use of force in the context of Soviet agreement to concrete 
10 
confidence-building measures' 
70 In October, ~r Gorbachev indicated that the USSR was willing to negotiate 
on a CS and XATO proposal for procedures requiring NATO and the Warsaw Pact to 
give annual advance notice of military manoeuvres. But several difficult 
issues remain unresolved, such as the Soviet desire to add independent air and 
sea movements to the land-based exercises, of which advance notification would 
have to be given. This approach has been rejected by the USA. 
F. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
71 The ~nited ~ations Organisation is an important world forum for the 
discussion of disarmament matters. The Ten should continue to coordinate 
the1r pOSitions with a vrew to speaking Wlth one voice at the General Assembly. 
72 Each year the UN General Assembly passes many resolutions designed to 
support the principle of arms control and disarmament and which often contain 
useful proposals on specific matters in this regard. While the United Nations 
may sometimes be considered ineffective, its repeated calls for disarmament 
ultimately represent common sense and - if listened to - offer hope for the 
10 Annex to OJ No. 2-326, Debates of the European Parliament, 8 May 1985 
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future of the world in which we live. If the voice of the United Nations is 
not heard, it is not because it does not speak but because there are those who 
do not wish to hear. 
73 The Secretary General of the United Nations also has a particular role to 
play, for example with regard to investigating allegations of the use of 
chemical weapons. 
74 The United ~ations has itself held two Special sessions on Disarmament. 
~hile these special sessions serve the useful function of drawing public 
attention to the need for effective arms control, the success in practical 
terms, as of the United Nations in general, depends on the political will of 
those who are most directly concerned in the disarmament and arms control 
negotiations - notably the superpowers. 
G. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT 
75 The high levels of defence expenditure by both East and West mean that 
developments in the arms control and disarmament fields could have considerable 
economic implications for the countries concerned. 
76 Cut backs in military programmes or expenditure could, at least 
temporarily, increase unemployment in some countries. In the longer term, 
however, a considerable degree of conversion should be possible. 
77 At the same time, savings on military expenditure could offer opportunities 
for expenditure in other areas. It is frightening that $550 billion is spent 
globally every year on armaments, more than one million dollars per minute. 
It is shocking when one thinks of the crushing poverty of a large proportion of 
the world's population which can only be solved by a huge increase in 
development aid, and of those third world countries which spend such an 
unnecessarily high proportion of their own GNP on arms. 
78 The amounts do not constitute a case for any one country's unilateral 
disarmament. They constitute an overwhelming case for serious, urgent and 
imaginative moves towards multilateral disarmament. 
79 The figures in the following tables with regard to the percentage of 
research and development budgets devoted to defence must be regarded as 
some~hat tentative because of the difficulty of producing truly comparable 
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figures for different nations. Some research and development expenditure not 
classified as relating to defence may have defence implications and similarly 
some expenditure related to defence may have spin-offs in non-military fields. 
For the purposes of this report it is the general outline and perceptible 
trends which are of significance. 
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1. Total Defence Expenditure 
Country I 1As a r. of 
d. 1>1 government spen 1ng I As a r. of GDP/GNP2) 
l 1980 I 1983 I 1980 I 1983 I I I I 
8 9.2 8.1 3.3 3.3 
OK I 7.4 I 6.8 I 2.5 I 2.4 
D 
3) I 22.5 I 23.2 I 3.3 I 3.4 
I I I I 
GR t 22.9 I 19.3 I 5.5 6.9 
~ I 18.9 I 18.7 I 4.0 I 4.2 
IRI. I 3.5 I 3. 1 I 1. 9 I 1.8 
I I I I 
I I 5.7 5. 1 2.4 2.8 
L I 3.1 I 3.2 I 0.9 I 0.9 
NL I 7.1 I 7.2 I 3.1 I 3.3 
I I I I 
UK 12.4 13.7 5.0 5.5 
p I 9.2 I 8.9 I 3.5 I 3.5 
E I 15.9 I 13.4 I 2.4 I 2.4 ~~=~·=~=~=~=~=~=~=~ --·------ - - - -
USA I 24.0 I 29.6 I 5.6 I 7.4 
JAP I 5.1 I 5.4 I 0.9 I 1.0 
USSR4) 
I I I I 
I : I : J 15 I 16 
Source: The Military Balance 1985-1986, published by the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
- -
- -
-
1)Based on local currency. These figures are designed to sho~ na~ional 
trends only. International comparisons may be invalidated by differences 
in the scope of government sector and in budgetary definitions 
2) Based on local currency. 
absence, GNP figures 
GOP figures are principally used; or, in their 
3)Including aid to West Berlin 
4>u . 
. s. DIA Est1mates 
·. 
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2. RATIO OF GOVERNMENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R and D) APPROPRIATIONS TO 
TOTAL BUDGET (%) 
1982 1983 1984 
-~----------------------------------------------------------
BELGIUM 1. 43 1 . 3 5 1. 36 
DE:'-;~ARK 1. 31 1. 43 1. 63 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 4.24 4.02 4.08 
FRANCE 5.59 5.96 6.20 
GREECE 0.60 0.55 0.66 
IRELA~D 0.71 0.80 0. 77 
ITALY 1. 32 1. 42 1. 58 
LCXE:-!BOCRG 0.00 0.00 0.00 
:\ETHERLANDS 2.26 2.48 2.38 
t.:::ITED KI:--:GDOM 3. 10 3. 16 3.20 
Et:R-10 3. 16 3. 18 3.26 
Source: EeROSTAT, CRONOS data bank. File ZRD 1 
3. RATIO OF GOVERNMENT REARCH AND DEVELOPMENT {R & D) APPROPRIATIONS TO GDP 
(%) 
1982 1983 1984 
BELGICM 0.65 0.60 0.59 
DE:'\~ARK 0.47 0.51 0.54 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 1. 21 1. 15 1.12 
FRA:'\CE I. 32 1. 40 1. 45 
GREECE 0. 20 0.20 0.24 
IRELA:\D 0.39 0.41 0. 39 
ITALY 0.64 0.71 0. 77 
LL'XENBOURG 0.00 0.00 0.00 
:\ETHERLA~DS 0.93 1.02 0.98 
I.:~ I TED KI!\GDOM 1.33 1. 33 1. 35 
ECR-10 1. 10 1. 11 1.12 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: EGROSTAT, CRONOS data bank, File ZRD 1 
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4. PERCENTAGE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT {R & D) BUDGETS DEVOTED TO DEFENCE 
1982 1983 1984 
BELGIUM 0.52 0.28 0.23 
DE~MARK 0.25 0.24 0.73 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 8.53 9.61 9.98 
FRANCE 35.39 32.67 33.41 
GREECE 0.00 0.39 3.46 
IRELAND 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ITALY 4.76 5.71 8.32 
LUXENBOURG 0.00 0.00 0.00 
:'\ETHERLA~DS 3.04 2.94 3. 11 
C:\ITED KINGDOM 47.65 49. 13 50.36 
Et.:_R-10 24_ 73 24.48 25.45 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: EUROSTAT, CRO~OS data bank, File ZRD 1 
5. DEFENCE EXPENDITURE OF USA AND JAPAN 
{in $ millions and at constant prices) 
Japan 
United States 
1975 
8,205 
139,277 
1980 
9,767 
143,981 
1981 
10,041 
153,884 
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1984, Table 3A.2, p~ 118 
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1983 
10,939 
186,544 
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H. THE POSITION OF JAPAN 
80 Although Article 9 of the Japanese constitution lays down that the country 
cannot resort to aggression and prohibits the establishment of a potential for 
war. it reserves to Japan the right of self-defence. In addition since World 
~ar II every Japanese Government has followed the three anti-nuclear principles 
of Japanese security policy, viz. total prohibition of the possession of 
nuclear weapons. of their manufacture, and of their introduction into the 
natlonal teJritory. 
81 In pursuance of these provisions. Japan has in the last ten years spent no 
more than 1% of GDP per year on the armed forces. This situation served to 
reassure Japan's lesser neighbours in South-East Asia, who for 30 years after 
1945 benefited also from the immense military power in South-East Asia and the 
Pacific of the Cnited States. However, the Vietnam war showed that this power 
~as no longer predominant, and in the last decade the military power of both 
the lSSR and China has been substantially increased in East Asia. 
82 These imperatives of security have led US Governments to press the Japanese 
to build up their self-defence forces, in order to share the military burden, 
assumed hitherto almost entirely by the United States, of safeguarding 
democratic states in East and South East Asia. The fact that the USA has so 
tar had little success in this policy affects the security of Europe, in that 
rs mil1tary resources are unduly stretched, and the US Congress is led to seek 
cut-backs in GS force strengths in the NATO area and elsewhere. Thus the 
strength of the Japanese self-defence forces is of direct military consequence 
to the Alliance. From another point of view, the security cost burden on the 
Japanese economy has been for decades so much lighter than for the economies of 
tlw lSA a11d the :\ATO allies that the latter have urought strong pressure to 
bear on Japan to play a wider security role, not only in East and South-East 
Asia security, but in the Pacific area. 
83 In response to this pressure Japan. supported by the USA, sought from NATO 
the status of an •external associate'. so as to lay the foundations of a 
defence triangle including the VSA, Europe and Japan. This approach was 
hu~ever rejected by the European members of the Alliance in 1983. Whatever 
the rights and wrongs of this decision, it remains of direct interest to the 
Community ~ember States who are members of NATO that Japan should play a 
greater part in the organisation of her legitimate self-defence, in order to 
fre~ rs military resources for other commitments. 
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84 A small move was made in this direction in September 1985 when the Japanese 
Government published a five-year defence spending plan for the armed forces 
(1986-90) which represents expenditure of an average of 1.4% per year of GOP. 
Although politically the breaking of the 1.0% per year barrier implied some 
risk to the Government, it could be expected to go some way to appease 
anti-Japanese, protectionist feeling in Congress and - less directly - in 
Europe. 
I. SOME OTHER ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT 
85 In order to provide as complete a picture as possible of disarmament issues 
the report will focus briefly on some other aspects of the problems raised. 
It could be argued that an entire report could be devoted to each of these 
issues and the treatment of them here will necessarily be brief. 
(i) Peace movements 
86 The peace movements appear to draw their strength from three main strands 
of opinion, that is to say pacificism, nationalism and anti-Americanism. 
Since 1980 the movements have been strongest in the Federal Republic, the 
~etherlands, the United Kingdom and in Sweden. 
37 Although World War II was described by both sides as a just war, its 
appalling toll in human life and the destruction of cities and towns, and the 
collapse of the economies of several European countries led many to espouse the 
cause of pacifism. Furthermore the nature of nuclear war and its consequences 
for Europe led to wide support for the pacifist cause, especially among Church 
l~aders and active Church members, particularly in the Protestant Church in 
~orthern Europe. The anti-Americanism which partly fuels the peace movements 
~as born in the decade of the Vietnam war and the subsequent Watergate scandal. 
It was re-activated by the twin-track decision of NATO in 1979 to station 
Cruise and Pershing missiles in NATO Member States unless the Soviet Union 
withdrew its missiles targeted on Western Europe. The overtly anti-Soviet 
policies and statements of President Reagan and Secre~ary of State Haig in 1980 
- 1982 served to many to justify growing anti-American feelings. 
88 A growing nationalism in Europe, which on the one hand has hindered 
progress towards the development of the Community, has on the other hand tended 
to reject involvement in military alliances such as NATO and to seek bilateral 
relations between West European countries and the Soviet Union. Economic 
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recession and massive unemployment have led to scepticism about the benefits to 
be derived from international economic organisations, such as the EEC, GATT, 
the OECD, and to a desire for national independence. 
89 The apogee of the peace movements was perhaps in 1981, when in October 
300,000 Germans demonstrated in Bonn against the stationing of Cruise and 
Pershing missiles in their country. One month later an enormous demonstration 
in Amsterdam showed that a wide cross-section of the population were opposed to 
the missiles. In the United Kingdom rallies against the missiles and against 
nuclear weapons, and in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament, attracted 
tens of thousands of people in 1981 and 1982. 
90 The last series of protests against the stationing of missiles was in the 
~etherlands in 1985, when 3.5 million signatures were put to a petition against 
deployment. Although successive Dutch Governments delayed a decision to 
deploy, it was finally taken in November 1985. A protest meeting called 
shortly before by the pacifist movement attracted only 25,000 people. 
91 Deployment of the missiles has taken place in some countries and will 
continue in others. Although the peace movements have been balked in their 
attempts to prevent it, the force of their campaigns may be traced in the 
rejection by ~ATO of the neutron bomb, the changed tone of President Reagan's 
approach to East-West relations, and the strenuous efforts made by the USA and 
its \ATO allies to make genuine progress in the various negotiations on arms 
control and disarmament. 
(ii) Nuclear-free zones 
92 There have over the years been a number of proposals for nuclear 
~eapon-free zones INWFZl throughout the world. Each such proposal should be 
examined separately and on its merits. Perhaps the most significant agreement 
to date was the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin 
America IThe Tlateloco Treaty). 
~3 As far as the central question of genuine, effective, verifiable and 
•nultllateral disarmament is concerned, NWFZ's are at best a peripheral issue 
since the creation of such zones will not of itself reduce the nuclear arsenals 
of the superpowers which are a threat to the entire world, including 
nuclear-free zones. 
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94 ~hile it is not possible to deal in detail with any of the proposals in 
this report, the following are amongst the more significant proposals which 
have been put forward as far as Europe is concerned. 
Central Europe 
95 As early as 1957, the Polish Foreign Minister Mr Rapacki suggested the idea 
of a nuclear weapons-free zone in Central Europe. This suggestion was taken 
up in the report of the Independent (Palme) Commission on Disarmament and 
Security Issues in June 1982, which recommended the establishment of a 
'battlefield nuclear weapon free zone' in Europe. What was envisaged was a 
300 kilometre wide zone dividing East and West and including parts of the FRG, 
the GDR and Czechoslovakia. 
96 Whereas such a zone might reduce the risk of precipitate, accidental or 
pre-emptive use of short-range nuclear weapons deployed in forward positions, 
it might be disadvantageous to the West because the Soviet Union, for 
geographical reasons, could reintroduce nuclear weapons to such a zone more 
quickly than the United States and because of the particularly important role 
of nuclear deterrence in NATO strategy. Also, the West might wish to use 
tactical nuclear weapons first, in face of a massive Soviet conventional 
attack. 
The Balkans 
97 In 1957 Romania proposed a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Balkans. This 
proposal was taken up by Bulgaria in October 1981 and most recently by Greece 
in 1983. Although a conference involving some of the Balkan states took place 
in 1984, no conclusions were reached and a number of states in the region -
notably Turkey- remain sceptical. 
Nordic area 
98 All of the Nordic countries are committed to non-possession of nuclear 
weapons. having signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and none of them have 
nuclear weapons on their territory. The region does not, however, constitute 
an \~FZ since the two NATO members, Norway and Denmark, are not committed to 
remaining nuclear weapons-free in wartime. A proposal has been circulating 
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for many years that the Nordic area should be designated a nuclear weapon-free 
zone. This proposal is supported by the Swedish Government and was most 
recently formulated by the Prime Minister, Mr Palme, in 1982. 
J. CONCLUSIONS 
99 Before drawing up conclusions, it is necessary briefly to discuss the 
relations of the European Community to the United States in regard to arms 
control and disarmament. During the term of office of President Carter and 
the first term of President Reagan, it was often difficult for European 
Governments to discern US policy lines on arms control and disarmament, by 
reason of their lack of definition, liability to sudden alteration and 
apparent, frequent disregard of European interests. 
100 Since President Reagan's re-election in November 1984, however, and the 
accession to power of General Secretary Gorbachev, the two super-powers have 
re-opened their dialogue, and the US Government has, as regards the Geneva 
talks and the summit of November 1985, consulted the Allies more closely. To 
some extent, closer consultation has resulted from demands in this sense made 
by the Allies, from their increasing cohesion within European political 
cooper~tion and from the added weight gained by the accession of Spain and 
' Portugal. 
101 But the total lack of consultation prior to President Reagan's March 1983 
speech on SDI and the initially tackless approach of the US Department of 
Defense to the Allies as regards SDI, have done much to damage the improved 
relationship on East-West relations, apart from disagreements over regional 
conflicts, economic issues and so on. 
102 Europe's strongest card as regards the arms control and disarmament 
negotiations is to define in advance, more clearly and more consistently the 
attitude of the Community and, separately, ··of those of its Member States in 
~ATO, to the ongoing and many-faceted negotiations. This requires the 
Community to exploit to the full the opportunities for defining a coherent 
foreign policy, covering security and political and economic relations, offered 
by the European Act of February 1986, which brings European Political 
Cooperation into the Treaties. The first such comprehensive Community foreign 
policy ~o be defined should be in the field of relations with the United 
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States, and must be based on the resolutions of the European Parliament in this 
specific field, and in the sectors of security, and political and economic 
relations. 
103 Parliament must be vigilant to ensure that the Community takes up this 
challenge and uses its new instrument to the full in order to formulate 
considered, timely and cogent policies on arms control and disarmament to the 
~nited States and the North Atlantic Alliance. 
104 Such policies should be based on the following general principles -
11) The need for the West to remain strong enough to defend itself, 
(2l The clamant need to achieve real arms control and disarmament, 
!3l The acceptance by the super-powers of Europe's role in all negotiations in 
this field. 
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ANNEX 
JOINT STATEMENT AFTER THE GENEVA SUMMIT 19-21 NOVEMBER 1985 
The first part of the text of the joint US-Soviet statement after the 
Summit talks was: 
'These comprehensive discussions covered the basic questions of US-Soviet 
relations and the current international situation. The meetings were frank 
and useful. Serious differences remain on a number of critical issues. 
~hile acknowledging the differences in their systems and approaches to 
irlternational issues, some greater understanding of each side's view was 
achieved by the two leaders. They agreed about the need to improve US-Soviet 
relations and thP. international situation as a whole. 
In this connection the two sides have confirmed the importance of an 
ongoing dialogue, reflecting their strong desire to seek common ground on 
existing problem~. 
They agreed to meet again in the nearest future. The General Secretary 
accepted an invitation by the President of the United States to visit the 
Cnited States of America and the President of the United States accepted an 
invitatjon by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU to 
visit the Soviet Union. Arrangements for and timing of the visits will be 
agreed upon through diplomatic channels. 
In their meetings, agreement was reached on a number of specific issues. 
Areas of agreement are registered on the following pages. 
SECURITY 
The sides, having discussed key security issues, and conscious of the 
special responsibility of the USSR and the US for maintaining peace, have 
agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Recognising 
that any conflict between the USSR and US could have catastrophic consequences, 
they emphasised the importance of preventing any war between them, whether 
nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority. 
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NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS 
The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on 
huclear and space arms. 
They agreed to accelerate the work at these negotiations, with a view to 
accomplishing the tasks set down in the joint US-Soviet agreement of 8 January 
1985, namely to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth, to 
limit and reduce nuclear arms and enhance strategic stability. 
Noting the proposals recently tabled by the US and the Soviet Union, they 
called for early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, 
including the principle of 50 per cent reductions in the nuclear arms of the US 
and the USSR appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF 
agreement. 
During the negotiations of these agreements, effective measures for 
verification of compliance with obligations assumed will be agreed upon. 
RISK REDUCTION CENTRES 
The sides agreed to study the question at the expert level of centres to 
reduce nuclear risk, taking into account the issues and developments in the 
Geneva negotiations. They took satisfaction in such recent steps in this 
direction as the modernisation of the Soviet-US hotline. 
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION 
General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan re-affirmed the 
commitment of the USSR and the US to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
~uclear Weapons and their interest in strengthening together with other 
countries the non-proliferation regime, and in further enhancing the 
effectiveness of the treaty, inter alia by enlarging its membership. 
They note with satisfaction the overall positive results of the recent 
review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
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The USSR and the US reaffirm their commitment, assumed by them under the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to pursue negotiations in 
good faith on matters of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament in accordance 
with Article 6 of the Treaty. 
The two sides plan to continue to promote the strengthening of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency and to support the activities of the agency 
in implementing safeguards as well as in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. 
They view positively the practice of regular Soviet-US consultations on 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which have been businesslike and 
constructive to continue this practice in the future. 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
In the context of discussing security problems, the two sides reaffirmed 
that they are in favour of a general and complete prohibition of chemical 
weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons. They 
agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable 
international convention on this matter. 
The two sides agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on the level of 
experts on all aspects of such a chemical weapons ban, including the question 
of verification. They agreed to initiate a dialogue on preventing the 
proliferation of chemical weapons. 
MBFR 
The two sides emphasised the importance they attach to the Vienna (MBFRl 
negotlations and expressed their willingness to work for positive results. 
CDE 
Attaching great importance to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and 
Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDEl and noting the 
progress made there, the two sides stated their intention to facilitate, 
together with the other participating states, an early and successful 
completion of the work of the conference. To this end, they reaffirmed the 
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\ 
11eed for a document which would include mutually acceptable confidence and· 
security building measures and give concrete expression and effect to the : 
principle of non-use of force. 
PROCESS OF DIALOGUE 
President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed on the need to 
place on a regular basis and intensify dialogue at various levels. Along with 
meetings between the leaders of the two countries, this envisages regular 
meetings between the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs and the US Secretary of 
State, as well as between the heads of other ministries and agencies. They 
agree that the recent visits of the heads of ministries and departments in such 
fields as agriculture, housing and protection of the environment have been 
useful. 
Recognising that exchanges of views on regional issues on the expert level 
have proven useful, they agree to continue such exchanges on a regular basis.' 
f .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Source: The Times, 22 November 1985. 
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